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Three Theories of Religious Activism and Violence:
Social Movements, Fundamentalists, and
Apocalyptic Warriors
HEATHER SELMA GREGG
Defense Analysis Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, USA
Numerous scholars have investigated religiously motivated violence, particularly in
the wake of September 11, including discussions on the role of modernity in
triggering religious violence, the increasing presence of religion in politics, the
violence-prone nature of certain religions, and religion’s correlation with ethnicity
and other conflict-intensifying variables. However, religious activism and violence
are not new phenomena. Few theories have been advanced that move across time
and space and, broadly, seek to explain the conditions under which religion becomes
involved in activism and violence. This article argues that three broad causal argu-
ments for religious activism—social movements, fundamentalism, and apocalyptic
warriors—help explain the conditions under which religiously motivated violence
occurs across time and space. These three causal arguments offer a spectrum of
goals within religious activism, ranging from challenging social practices and
government policies, to defending specific interpretations and practices of the faith,
to hastening the apocalypse. Furthermore, each of these theories proposes
different ways that religion becomes involved in social, political, and religious
activism and the conditions under which groups use violence to further their goals.
The article concludes by suggesting countermeasures for each type of religious
activism.
Keywords apocalypse, fundamentalism, religion, social movements, terrorism,
violence
In 1994, sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer argued in The New Cold War? Religious
Nationalism Confronts the Secular State that, despite expectations that religion
would retreat further and further from mainstream society and politics to the
private lives of individuals, a new era of religious activism—what he calls religious
nationalism—is on the rise.1 These claims are further stated by Toft, Philpott, and
Shaw, who assert that—despite the predictions of the ‘‘secularization thesis’’ that
religion would become less and less relevant as science and technology increased—
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religious activism has been on the rise for the last forty years.2 Some but not all of
this religious activism uses violence as a means of reasserting itself into public life.
Alongside these investigations of modern causes of religious activism, several
scholars note that religiously motivated violence is not a new phenomenon. Historic
examples abound, including the Jewish Zealots, the Christian Crusades, Shia Muslim
Assassins, Sunni apocalyptic Mahdis, and even ancient tales that have perpetrated
violence in the name of Buddhism.3 These classic examples of religiously motivated
violence are typically jettisoned by scholars seeking to understand current religious
activism and bellicosity, suggesting that contemporary causes are distinct from
historic cases.
This article argues that three broad causal arguments for religious activism—
social movements, fundamentalism, and apocalyptic war—help explain the con-
ditions under which religion becomes involved in activism and violence occurs across
time and space. These three causal arguments offer a spectrum of goals within
religious activism, ranging from challenging social practices and government policies
relating to religion, to defending specific interpretations and practices of the faith,
to hastening the apocalypse. Furthermore, each of these theories proposes different
ways that religion becomes involved in activism and the conditions under which
groups use violence to further their goals. Finally, these theories transcend time
and space and seek to explain common historic and contemporary causes of
religiously motivated violence.
The article continues in four parts. The first section outlines examples of litera-
ture on contemporary religious activism and violence, noting that progress has been
made in identifying correlates and contemporary causes of religious activism and
violence, but not necessarily identifying the conditions under which religious
activism and violence occur across time and space. The second section develops
three theories for religious activism and posits the conditions under which they turn
violent: Social Movement Theory and religion’s involvement in mass mobilization,
a theory of fundamentalism based off of numerous scholars’ works, and apocalyptic
warriors, based off of Mark Juergensmeyer’s concept of Cosmic War. The third
section compares these different lenses and offers key questions for identifying the
different types of religious activism. And the fourth section proposes countermea-
sures for each type of activism.
Literature on Contemporary Religious Activism and Violence
The focus of literature on contemporary causes of religiously motivated activism
and violence are understandable. Religious terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism,
appears to be on the rise and has persisted despite over a decade of U.S. military
and covert operations against Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The Arab Spring
has ushered in Islamist parties to power through democratic elections in Egypt
and Tunisia. Sectarian conflict has plagued numerous countries around the globe,
including Nigeria, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. And, in the United States, religion
appears to be asserting itself into political life, informing debates on policies relating
to reproduction, stem cell research, and evolution.
Several scholars have conducted research aimed at understanding these contem-
porary causes of religious activism and violence. Perhaps the premier example of
a modern causal argument for religious activism and violence is Huntington’s ‘‘clash
of civilizations’’ thesis. Huntington posits that the end of the Cold War will usher



































in a new era in global politics marked by battles between civilizations, which—at
their roots—are based on religion. Huntington states: ‘‘For forty-five years the Iron
Curtain was the central dividing line in Europe. That line has moved several hundred
miles east. It is now the line separating the peoples of Western Christianity, on the
one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox people on the other.’’4 However, despite
his lengthy discussion on the historical roots of civilizations, his argument is con-
cerned with explaining what he perceives to be the current rise of religious activism
and militancy, particularly Islamic bellicosity. In his words: ‘‘Islam’s borders are
bloody and so are its innards.’’5
Toft, Philpott, and Shaw also are concerned with the current rise of religious
activism and violence. They posit that two variables are critical for understanding
contemporary assertions of religious activism, what they call ‘‘political theology’’:
the rise of democracy and the desire for religious freedom; and the relationship
between religious groups and their governments.6 The authors state: ‘‘The resurgent
faiths have benefited from, rather than been hindered by, those forces that are most
distinctive to the modern world—democracy, modernization in communication
and technology, and globalization.’’7 They further assert: ‘‘The relationship that
a religious actor enjoys with its government, along with its political theology, explain
a great deal about what kind of politics it pursues. . . .’’8 Toft, Philpott, and Shaw’s
argument is clearly focused on a modern resurgence of religious activism. However,
the authors are also quick to note that religious activism and violence has existed in
the past; it went through a period of ‘‘three centuries of decline,’’ and then began to
reassert itself in the 1960s.9 Their causal argument, while useful for explaining cur-
rent causes, does not address the previous waves of religious activism nor adequately
investigate their decline.
David C. Rapoport provides valuable insights into the rise of religiously
motivated terrorism in the modern era. In ‘‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,’’
he describes anarchism, anti-colonialism, ‘‘new left’’ Marxism, and the current wave
of religious terrorism with the aim of better understanding the unique attributes that
religiously motivated terrorism may play in the modern era.10 Rapoport argues
that religious terrorism has unique goals from its counterparts, namely the aim to
organize the state around religion. Rapoport also notes that this wave of terrorism
aims to destroy targets, rather than to use violence to garner attention and support.11
He further observes that the first three waves of terrorism lasted around forty years
apiece; this insight may suggest that religious terrorism, which began in 1979 and
primarily involves Islam, would ebb around 2025. However, Rapoport also asserts that
this current wave of terrorism shows signs of being ‘‘more durable’’ and it may outlast
the lifespan of its predecessors. Specifically, religious terrorist groups are fewer in
number but more deadly, and many of the groups have persisted beyond two decades,
suggesting persistence and resilience. Rapoport’s observations provide a useful
foundation upon which to further investigate the conditions under which religious
terrorists emerge, their different motivations, and how they relate to and are unique
from religious activists that may use other means for changing the status quo.
Several key quantitative studies also have sought to better understand contem-
porary trends in religious activism and violence. For example, political scientist
Jonathan Fox has written extensively on religiously motivated violence. Building
off of the Minorities at Risk dataset for his analyses, he investigates the claims that
Islam is a more violence-prone religion, finding that, statistically speaking, it is not
but that ‘‘religion tends to be a more important factor in conflicts involving Islamic



































ethnoreligious groups.’’12 He also tests Huntington’s ‘‘clash of civilizations’’
hypothesis and finds that generally ‘‘there has been little change in the ratio of
civilizational versus non-civilizational ethnic conflict since the start of the Cold War’’
but that clashes between Western civilization and Islam have increased dramatically.13
Fox further uses quantitative analysis to test the separation of religion and state in
the West and the Middle East, and the influence of religion on grievance formation.14
All of these inquiries provide valuable insights into correlations of religion and
conflict, but they do not advance causal arguments, nor do they look back in time.
In Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century, Fox posits that religion
provides four social functions: it offers a meaningful framework for understanding
the world; it creates rules and norms that link individuals to the wider movement;
it links individuals together; and it legitimizes behavior. These four functions help
shape ethnic conflict.15 Fox’s identification of these variables is a useful step towards
creating a theory of religiously motivated violence. Furthermore, Fox proposes
hypotheses with each of these variables that suggest the conditions under which they
lead to religiously motivated conflict. This article will contend, however, that not
all religiously motivated violence is rooted in ethnic conflict. Some religious violence
is transnational in its goals and crosses ethnic bounds. Therefore more than one
causal argument is needed to explain religiously motivated violence.
Basedau, Struever, Juellers, and Wegenast use a database on Sub-Saharan
African countries to quantitatively investigate whether religion contributes to armed
conflict in this region. Similar to Fox, their study finds that, particularly when over-
lapping with ethnic identities, religion does contribute to conflict in these countries.16
Another article stresses the importance of ‘‘religious actors and institutions’’ as
escalating effects on conflict in Africa; yet, at the same time, religious groups can
also be catalysts for peace.17 These studies are important for understanding religion’s
role as an accelerator in ethnic conflict, but leaves unanswered exactly how religion
contributes to ethnic conflict, if there are missing variables in the dataset that may
also be important for understanding the rise of religious activism and violence,
and if these findings move across time and space. In other words, more work is
needed to create a theory from this research with broad explanatory power.
There is also a healthy body of literature on religion’s involvement in mobili-
zation, primarily for political ends. For example, Wald, Owen, and Hill build off
of social influence processes—which argue that formal organizations that provide
‘‘face-to-face’’ interactions are more likely to promote consensus—to test the effects
of church attendance on ‘‘theological and political conservatism.’’ Their research
finds a strong link between conservative theological views and political views in
the United States.18 Wald, Silverman, and Fridy further investigate the role that
religion plays in social movements, looking particularly at how religion shapes the
motives for political action, the resources it brings to movements, and how religion
affects and is affected by political action. They contend that greater systematic and
scientific inquiry into religion’s contribution to the interplay of these variables will
help illuminate its contribution to social movements.19
Driskell, Embry, and Lyon use a unique survey instrument to measure
religious beliefs—as opposed to practices such as church attendance—and their
impact on voting in the United States. They find that, ‘‘although some macro
religious beliefs significantly increase macro political behavior, believers in an
involved God are less likely to participate politically.’’20 Outside of U.S. politics,
Trejo looks at the role of the Catholic Church in aiding mobilization of indigenous



































populations in Mexico. He finds that religious competition with expanding
protestant movements has compelled the Church to become involved in indigenous
politics and social services as a means of competing for parishioners’ loyalty, not
changes in ecclesiastical doctrine.21
Scholarship that connects religious beliefs and practices to social and political
mobilization is useful for understanding the conditions under which religion
becomes involved in political activism; but as will be argued, mobilization is just
one way that religion affects activism, and mobilization alone does not explain the
conditions under which religious groups resort to violence.
Three Theories for Religious Activism and Violence
Adapting Wiktorowicz’s definition of Islamic activism, this article defines religious
activism as the mobilization of contention to support religious causes. Religious acti-
vism includes, but is not limited to, the use of violence.22 Three broad theories—
social movements, a theory of fundamentalism, and apocalyptic war—offer a range
of conditions under which religion becomes involved in activism, in addition to pro-
viding a spectrum of goals of religious activism, ranging from challenging social
practices and government policies concerning religion, to defending specific interpre-
tations and practices of the faith, to hastening the apocalypse. Furthermore, these
theories move beyond just modern causes of religious activism and violence; they
transcend time and space and seek to explain common historic and contemporary
causes of religiously motivated violence and activism. Taken together, these three
theories cover the bulk of religious activism and violence, both historically and in
contemporary times.
Religious Social Movements
Social Movement Theory (SMT) posits the conditions under which grievances,
which are plentiful, transform into mass movements aimed at social or political
change, which are rarer. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald offer a particularly useful
summary of the theory, including its evolution and its causal logic. The authors
describe three variables that scholars of SMT have identified as necessary conditions
for social movements to emerge: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and
framing processes.23
The political opportunities variable considers how political constraints and
opportunities, particularly institutionalized politics, shape the emergence and success
of social movements. Building off of work by Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and
European scholars, the political opportunity variable focuses specifically on how
changes in both institutionalized politics and informal groups with political power
explain the emergence of social movements.24 While necessary for understanding
social movements, particularly the timing of their emergence, the political opport-
unity variable is not sufficient for explaining the rise of all movements and
particularly their success or failure.
Mobilizing structures, the second variable, are ‘‘those collective vehicles, infor-
mal as well as formal through which people mobilize and engage in collective
action.’’25 This variable builds off of two sub-theories: resource mobilization theory,
which investigates the types of resources available to a group and how they are
employed for mobilization; and social movement organizations, or how formal
and informal groups and networks facilitate social movements.26 This variable



































focuses heavily on the process of mobilization, rather than opportunities, as an
explanation for the conditions under which social movements emerge.
The third variable, framing processes, considers the role that narratives and a
sense of common purpose play in the formation of social movements and success.
David Snow defines framing as ‘‘the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people
to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and
motivate collective action.’’27 This variable includes difficult-to-measure aspects of
social movements such as identity, symbols, cultural values and norms, ideology,
and shared meaning. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald contend, ‘‘At a minimum
people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic
that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem.’’28 Furthermore, McAdam
hypothesizes that ‘‘cognitive liberation,’’ or the hope that change is possible, is neces-
sary for social movements to emerge and is part of successful framing.29 Framing
processes, in other words, seek to understand how participants in collective action
understand the problem and its solution.
Taken together, SMT posits that political opportunities, mobilizing structures,
and framing processes explain the necessary conditions that transform grievances
into activism. As they take shape, social movements are highly visible collectives that
aim to mobilize large numbers in order to effect change. Social movements tend to
draw on preexisting groups and their networks to mobilize individuals into loosely
affiliated collectives. Given their size and loose organizational structure, social
movements usually have porous borders and individuals can join and leave the cause
with relatively little cost. Framing processes create the conditions through which
individuals who join the movement share common meaning and purpose. If done
correctly, framing creates a form of collective peer pressure, where individuals feel
compelled to join up to be part of the experience.30 This point is further echoed
by Williams, who contends that the ideology of social movements needs to be rooted
and understood in the wider society’s culture in order to be effective.31
It is important to note that not all social movements are violent; in fact many
successful movements have been purposefully non-violent, such as Gandhi’s Quit
India movement, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s approach to the U.S. Civil Rights
Movement, Bishop Desmond Tutu’s call for the non-violent resolution of apartheid,
and the Dalai Lama’s non-violent protest against Chinese occupation. Non-violent
social movements also exist in Islam, although less well-known, and include the
20th-century Pashtun Badshah Khan’s creation of 100,000 non-violent Khudai
Khidmatgars to oppose British rule in the frontier region of South Asia, and the
current-day non-violent philosophy of Sheikh Jawdat Saeed.32 All of these move-
ments have used religion to shape their non-violent social movements.33
When social movements turn violent, it is typically for a few key reasons. First,
political opportunities may be blocked, such as changing a policy or a country’s
leader through elections. In such cases, violence becomes one of the few remaining
options for change. Second, social movements may turn to violence if the movement
has become frustrated and some of its members feel violence is necessary to realize
its goal. Third, violence can also be a tool used to push for negotiations with the
opposition. Finally, violence may also be used as a means to draw attention to the
cause and inspire recruits.
The goals of social movements are varied. They can range from mobilization
to change a specific government policy to revolution. They can also mobilize
to challenge social issues within a country or region. Regardless of the goal, social



































movements typically have specific objectives that draw the attention and support of
elites, formal and informal organizations, and large numbers of individuals that
agree with that immediate objective. Typically, once a social movement has achieved
its goal, it demobilizes.
Religious social movements, a specific type of social movement, involve
contention and mass mobilization that draw from religious resources and, in
some cases, further religious goals. Christian Smith argues that not only is religion
useful for mobilization—as is observed by Wald et al., Driskell et al., and Trejo—
religion also informs framing and the goals for which social movements fight
more broadly. Resources include trained, legitimate leaders; preexisting networks,
organizational structures, and communications channels; and material resources
such as money, buildings, schools, and hospitals.34 Framing resources in religion
include a moral framework to which adherents can relate; group cohesion and
common identity; symbols and scripture that can be interpreted to justify the
cause; and stories of persecution and perseverance that can create fortitude in diffi-
cult times.35 These observations are echoed by Billings, who uses a Gramscian
approach to consider the conditions under which religion becomes an oppositional
force for change, noting that religion not only provides leadership and resources
of mobilization, but also beliefs that help unite opposition movements.36 Williams
further notes that religion can provide cultural resonance for framing wider social
movements.37
Several scholars have used SMT to explain the rise of recent religious social
movements around the globe. The edited volume Islamic Activism highlights the role
that Islam has played in fostering social movements, particularly in the Middle East.
The volume considers cases where violence has been instrumental to the movement—
such as the GIA in Algeria, groups within Egypt, and Hamas in Palestine—and cases
where violence has not played a predominant role in mobilization, specifically Saudi
Arabia and Turkey.38 Scholars have also used SMT to explain the emergence of the
U.S. Civil Rights Movement (led by a Christian minister, utilizing church networks
and scripture to frame activism for equality);39 and the 1979 Iranian Revolution (led
by a cleric, mobilizing various groups throughout the country to oust the Shah, and
using Islam to justify revolt and frame the solution).40 More recently, scholars have
used SMT to explain the rise of the 2010–2011 Arab Spring, and the different roles
that religion played in uprisings throughout several countries, including movements
aimed at including religion in the goals for which groups are mobilizing.41 Finally, it
is important to note that social movements may draw on religious resources for
mobilization, but the goals for which the movement is directed may not be religious.
An example of this would be the Polish Solidarity movement in the 1980s, which
used the Catholic Church as a source of mobilization and legitimacy, but did not
have overtly religious goals.42
Fundamentalism Theory and Violence
Fundamentalism is a poorly defined phenomenon and, unlike SMT, there is no
clearly articulated fundamentalism theory. The term fundamentalism was originally
used to explain a new conservative form of Christianity that emerged in the United
States in the early 1900s, and that formed as a counterpoint to modernism. There-
fore, for some, fundamentalism carries an inherently Christian connotation. More
broadly the term has come to denote any individual or group that believes in the



































literal nature of scripture, clear-cut religious practices and beliefs, and the perception
that there is an urgent need to get back to basics—the ‘‘fundamentals of the faith’’—
which are being corrupted or have been lost, and to reassert religion into society and,
in some cases, political life.
Several scholars note that the term fundamentalism is also problematic because
it carries negative connotations, suggesting that fundamentalists are by definition
militant, extremist, irrational, unyielding, and even violent.43 Furthermore, rarely
do those associated with fundamentalism self-identify as such.44 However, despite
the Christian origins of fundamentalism and its lack of specificity, the term does
point to an important trend occurring across religious traditions and a phenomenon
that has become entangled with violent action. Therefore, for lack of a better term,
a theory of fundamentalism is proposed here.
Building off of several works on fundamentalism, including the authors of the
five volume series Fundamentalism Project, Mark Juergensmeyer’s work in The
New Cold War and Global Rebellion, Fox’s work on fundamentalism, and the ideas
of Gabriel Almond and R. Scott Appleby, it is possible to identify the causal logic
of fundamentalism and the conditions under which fundamentalist movements turn
to violence.
Overall, fundamentalists are different from their mainstream adherents in the
sense of threat that they perceive to their faith and religious way of life. This sense
of threat compels fundamentalists to take actions aimed at preserving what they
believe to be the correct interpretation and practice of their religion. Literature on
fundamentalism identifies two triggers that produce a religious reaction in particular.
First, fundamentalists react to the rise of secularism. Fundamentalists perceive secu-
larism encroaching on religion and forcing it to the margins of society and political
life, and that secularism is leading to moral decay. Fox contends: ‘‘the two character-
istics that define fundamentalism are its origins as a defensive reaction to modernity
and the attempt to impose fundamentalist rules and standards of behavior on society
as a whole in order to actualize this defense.’’45 Juergensmeyer argues that secularism
and fundamentalism (what he calls religious nationalism) are both ideologies, com-
plex systems of beliefs that aspire to shape political and social action. As such, secu-
larism and fundamentalism are in direct competition with one another.46 For
example, ‘‘creationists’’ (creationism is also referred to as intelligent design) are a
form of Christian fundamentalists who see evolution as false teaching and in direct
competition with their beliefs about how the world began. Some creationists feel that
their beliefs are being marginalized in public schools and national discourse within
the United States, prompting them to push for greater inclusion of the creationist
perspective in schools through the courts, or to remove their children from public
schools altogether.47
It is important to note that, while some within religious groups feel secularism is
threatening their faith, not all religious adherents are fundamentalists. The vast
majority of those practicing religion do not see secularism as incompatible with faith,
and continue to live in a world with secularist and modernist ideals as well as
religious beliefs. However, for a minority, the rise of secularism is understood as
a threat to the faith, and this threat requires the need for direct action to prevent
the further erosion of religion from public life. Most scholars would agree that
fundamentalism, including the violence it invokes, is defensive in nature.
A second distinct trigger of fundamentalism, one that is less discussed in the
literature but as important, is new interpretations and practices that emerge from



































within a particular religious tradition and that challenge more conservative under-
standings of the faith. For example, source criticism—the practice of using historical
evidence to identify the human sources of scripture in Christianity—ignited conflicts
and schisms within several denominations between those that see Christian scriptures
as the literal word of God and those that understand it to be divinely inspired, but
also the product of humans. Source criticism caused a schism within the Lutheran
church in America, creating what became the larger Evangelical Lutheran Church
in America, which uses source criticism, and several smaller Synods, which do
not.48 More recent examples of new interpretations and practices within religious
traditions include ordaining women as clerics and sanctioning gay marriage.
Fundamentalist reactions to new interpretations and practices within a religious
tradition aim to prevent what they believe to be false and destructive beliefs and
practices from taking hold. This type of fundamentalist response looks more like
a civil war within a tradition, rather than a religious reaction against wider society
or a government’s policies.
Fundamentalists react in at least three distinct ways to the perceived threats from
secularism and new interpretations of the faith. First, fundamentalists may choose to
isolate themselves from the threat. This course of action could include physically iso-
lating by creating separate communities, breaking off from the mainstream religion
and forming new sects or denominations, or socially isolating the group from wider
society by creating parallel institutions, such as schools, clinics, stores, and so on.
Groups may also choose to isolate by creating distinct and highly visible forms of
dress—such as clothing, head gear, beards, and so on—that distinguish them from
others within the faith and wider society. Isolation is a possible course of action for
either threats from secularization or new interpretations within the faith.
Second, groups may attempt to change policies or other aspects of governance
through political action, including through elections or pressuring the government
for change through demonstrations and other means. The previously mentioned
debate over teaching evolution or creationism in school is an example of groups
using political action to change laws in their favor. Religious groups have also used
political action in attempts to change laws on abortion, gay marriage, and stem cell
research in the United States.
Third, fundamentalists may choose violence as a course of action in an attempt
to push back the perceived threat, either from society or from within the faith.
Rapoport notes that a fundamentalist group ‘‘is characterized as militant because
it pursues causes so aggressively that it breaks laws made by the state.’’49 As with
social movements, violence for fundamentalists is primarily instrumental; it is
a means for realizing larger goals. Also similar to social movements, fundamentalists
may turn to violence if they feel they do not have adequate political avenues to affect
change, or if the political process is taking too long; violence becomes necessary to
stem the perceived tide against a growing threat. Second, fundamentalists may resort
to violence if they feel betrayed by their political leaders. For example, in the 1956
elections in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) cam-
paigned on promises of preferential treatment for the island’s majority Sinhalese
Buddhists. When Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaika failed to deliver on these
promises, he was assassinated by a Buddhist monk in 1959.50 Third, violence can be
a tool to clarify who is in the group and who is not; in this case it is an instrument
to purify the movement from within and make examples of those that are not truly
committed. Takfiri violence, killing apostate or wayward Muslims, is an example



































of this form of violence. Finally, fundamentalists may resort to violence if they feel
threatened by society or government. Overall, fundamentalist violence is reactive,
not proactive. This form of violence stands in sharp contrast to apocalyptic war,
which will be described in the next section.
It is worth noting that these three courses of action are not mutually exclusive,
and groups can change strategies over time or as the perception of threat changes.
For example, the anti-abortion movement in the United States, which is overwhelm-
ingly driven by religious adherents, has gone through periods of violent and
non-violent action in its bid to reverse the legality of abortion. Beginning in the
1980s, the anti-abortion movement, especially the Army of God, believed (paradoxi-
cally) that violence and even murder was necessary to uphold the commandment
‘‘thou shall not kill’’ and prevent abortion. The organization carried out clinic
bombings and assassinations of doctors and nurses. When this approach to counter-
ing abortion began to turn supporters away from the movement, violence was largely
abandoned and political action resumed as the primary course of action, although a
small minority still engages in violent acts against abortion today.51
The goals of fundamentalists are to return the faith to what they believe is its
pristine and correct state. This goal therefore suggests that the faith was practiced
correctly at some point in its history—a ‘‘golden age’’—but that this correct
interpretation has been lost or corrupted and there is a need to get back to the funda-
mentals of the faith. This goal further suggests that fundamentalists believe there is
only one right practice (orthopraxy) and belief (orthodoxy) of the faith; all other
interpretations are wrong. Furthermore, fundamentalists aim to create clear borders
that separate the true and faithful from the misguided and corrupt.
Almond, Appleby, and Sivan identify nine characteristics, five ideological and four
organizational, associated with fundamentalist movements: reactivity to the marginali-
zation of the faith; selectivity in scripture and practices; moral Manichaeism (dividing
the world between right and wrong, good and bad); absolutism and inerrancy of
scriptures, beliefs, and practices; millennialist thinking; elect and chosen membership;
sharp boundaries; authoritarian organizations; and specific behavioral requirements.52
These nine characteristics reveal interesting paradoxes in fundamentalist think-
ing and behavior. Fundamentalists claim to be returning to the pure form of their
faith, yet they are selective with scriptures and the practices they emphasize. They
reject secularism and claim to be upholding the founding practices of the faith, yet
often use modern tools of technology to further their goals, such as computers,
the internet, and social media. They are millennialist, meaning that they long for life
beyond this one, yet are deeply concerned with the world in the here and now. These
paradoxes make negotiating with fundamentalists more difficult than with social
movements, but still possible, as will be discussed in the final section.
Fundamentalism is not unique to one religion; rather it can be found as a parti-
cular interpretation across religious traditions. Examples of fundamentalist move-
ments include the ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, within Judaism. The Haredi have
strict regulations in both practices and beliefs of their Jewish faith. They have chosen
to self-segregate into communities of like-minded adherents. In Israel, they have an
enclave in Jerusalem, Meir Sharim, which includes its own schools and synagogues.
The Haredim traditionally have not served in the Israeli military and, until recently,
have eschewed political participation. They consider the state of Israel a secular
abomination that has failed to keep the true tenets of the faith.53 They do not use
violence to further their goals.



































Another example of a fundamentalist movement is the salafi interpretation of
Islam. Salafi believe that Islam was at its most pure state during the time of the
Prophet Mohammed and, following his death, the leadership of his companions
(Salaf as-Saleh or ‘‘Pious Predecessors’’), who knew the Prophet personally and
could guide the community by his example. Salafi believe that the Qur’an and the
example of the Prophet provide a complete guide for Islam today. Wictorowicz
summarizes Salafism as follows:
Salafis are united by a common religious creed, which provides principles
and a method for applying religious beliefs to contemporary issues and
problems. This creed revolves around strict adherence to the concept of
tawhid (the oneness of God) and ardent rejection of a role for human rea-
son, logic, and desire. Salafis believe that by strictly following the rules
and guidance in the Qur’an and Sunna (path or example of the Prophet
Muhammad) they eliminate the biases of human subjectivity and
self-interest, thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth of God’s
commands. From this perspective, there is only one legitimate religious
interpretation; Islamic pluralism does not exist.54
Salafism, therefore, aims at a return to what they believe was the golden age of
Islam, where the faith was correctly understood and practiced. Wictorowicz notes
that Salafi use different means to realize this goal; most are quietist, eschewing polit-
ical involvement; some are ‘‘politicos’’ and work through government (including
democracy) to realize their goals or aim to seize the state by other means; and some
are jihadis, believing that violence is the necessary path for change.55
Apocalyptic War
Cosmic War—what this article will call apocalyptic war—is perhaps the form of
activism that is most commonly associated with religious violence. In ‘‘Sacrifice
and Cosmic War,’’ Juergensmeyer argues that virtually all of the world’s religious
traditions contain scriptures and beliefs that describe divine battles between the
forces of Good and Evil and that these battles are struggles to create ‘‘ultimate
order’’ and conquer ‘‘ultimate disorder,’’ which is eternal death and damnation.56
For many religions, the culmination of this battle is the belief in the end of
times (such as the Apocalypse in Christianity, the End of Days in Judaism, the
Last Judgment in Islam, and the arrival of Kalki, the tenth avatar of Vishnu in
Hinduism), in which the final battle of Good versus Evil will occur on this earth,
and Good will triumph. The apocalypse is accompanied by clear signs that the
end is near and that the faithful must rise up, stand firm in the face of trials and
hardship, and defend the faith.
Religious adherents engage in apocalyptic war because they believe that it will
hasten the apocalypse, a practice known as ‘‘catastrophic Messianism.’’ Apocalyptic
war occurs when adherents believe that current-day events are signs that the end is here,
and that their participation in the Final Battle is necessary for both Good to triumph
and for their own eternal salvation. For those who participate in apocalyptic war, the
promise of salvation and the millennium, a period of peace and harmony, is promised.
Juergensmeyer argues that apocalyptic war is both deeply personal and collective—all
who participate in it are fighting on behalf of personal and group salvation.57



































Apocalyptic war thinking is triggered by acute personal and collective
trauma brought about by catastrophic events or persistent trials. For example,
war, occupation, corruption, lawlessness, and natural disasters may lead some to
believe that these are signs of the end of times and the war between Good and Evil
is occurring in the here and now. Under these conditions, earthly battles become
spiritual battles in which the faithful must participate. Juergensmeyer posits that
holy battles for the conquest of Good over Evil know no specific enemy or definitive
goal; rather, the battle is against amorphous disorder. Apocalyptic war, therefore,
does not know incremental goals or compromise.58
Political psychologists Robins and Post contend that charismatic leaders provide
the necessary interpretation of events and direct followers through times of calamity,
offering hope to the faithful.59 They argue, ‘‘For the followers, such an inspired leader
has provided a diagnosis of the ills afflicting the world and has given them a special
role to play. He has made sense for them of the surrounding chaos.’’60 In other words,
leaders use scriptures and the expectation of the end times to offer an explanation
for the suffering and trials of current situations and what individuals should do in
order to liberate themselves, spiritually and literally, from these trying circumstances.
Unlike social movements and fundamentalists, violence in apocalyptic war is
a necessary condition. Apocalyptic warriors expect to encounter violent opposition
and to meet violence with violence. However, violence is more than just a necessary
instrument for achieving apocalyptic warriors’ millennialist goals; it is a sacred and
necessary duty that cleanses the world of sin and Evil. Furthermore, apocalyptic
warriors often depict their struggle in contradictory terms, that the world must be
destroyed in order for it to be saved, or that the war cannot be lost, but may be
unwinnable in this lifetime.61
It is important to note that numerous examples of apocalyptic groups exist that are
eagerly awaiting final justice and the end of times, but that are not violent or willing
to take the timing of the apocalypse into their own hands; in other words, they are
apocalyptic but not apocalyptic warriors. For example, Judaism has a rich history
of apocalyptic thinking that is captured in its mystical tradition, the Kabbalah. How-
ever, Kabbalists have been instructed through the ages to keep hope in their millenni-
alist expectations, but that the end will not be revealed beforehand, nor will it be
the result of human will; their job is to be faithful and vigilant.62 Another example
is the Millerite Movement in the United States, in which William Miller predicted
the second coming of Jesus from 1843–1845. Despite these millennialist expectations
not being fulfilled, the movement did not engage in violence to hasten the apocalypse
and it later led to the creation of the Seventh Day Adventist church.63
The transformation of apocalyptic imagining, which is present in all religions,
to apocalyptic war, which is unusual, hinges on the role of the charismatic leader.
The charismatic leader is the one that identifies real-world events as signs of the
end of times, and connects those events to apocalyptic expectations and necessary
actions—specifically violence—for the true believer. Behind every apocalyptic war
is a charismatic leader that not only identifies the problem, but the course of action
required of the faithful, which is to rise up and fight for Good to triumph over Evil.
Rapoport contends that, in order for apocalyptic war to take hold, signs of the end
of time and the need for urgent action must be exaggerated; this exaggeration is the
result of leaders.64
Several examples illustrate the complexity of apocalyptic war thinking. For
example, Pope Urban II called the Christian Crusades in 1095 to aid the Byzantine



































Empire and liberate Jerusalem from ‘‘infidels.’’ The Pope promised salvation to
those who undertook the sacred battle.65 The First Crusade was supposed to be
an organized military expedition, headed by lords from participating countries.
However Peter the Hermit, a charismatic French ascetic, heard the Pope’s call and
began to raise his own army of commoners bent on hastening the second coming of
Jesus and securing their eternal salvation. Answering his call, average citizens marched
off to Jerusalem in the spring of 1096 in search of salvation and the second coming of
Jesus. This pack of apocalyptic warriors began their quest to hasten the second coming
by first slaughtering Jews in the Rhine Valley on Good Friday, an act of revenge for
Jews’ participation in the crucifixion of Jesus.66 Crusading evolved into a sporadic,
holy war that drew Europeans in search of fortune, adventure, and salvation. At
perhaps its greatest extreme, the Children’s Crusade inspired thousands of peasants
to walk over the Alps to the sea, where they believed they would be miraculously
transported to Jerusalem. Nearly all died in the mountains.67
A more recent example of apocalyptic war thinking involves the ideology of
Aum Shinrikyo. Led by the semi-blind Japanese social outcast Shoko Asahara,
the movement aimed to rid the world of impurities by using WMD to start World
War III, which would cause massive death and destruction. Asahara promised his
followers that they would be miraculously preserved from the battle, or would be
reincarnated, and would live to repopulate the earth; in fact he promised paradoxi-
cally to save the world by destroying it. In 1995, Aum followers attempted to realize
their apocalyptic dreams by deploying Sarin gas in the Tokyo subway, which they
believed would spark World War III. The attacks killed thirteen and wounded
hundreds. Asahara and 200 members were convicted for the attacks in 2000 and
Asahara has been on death row since that time. At its zenith, Aum Shinrikyo was
estimated to have more than 30,000 members around the globe and had succeeded
in raising an estimated $300 million to $1 billion in cash and assets for its cause.68
Some contemporary Islamic activism shows signs of apocalyptic war thinking.
Current earthly struggles are representations of a much bigger battle between the
forces of Good and Evil. These struggles are trials requiring the faithful to rise up
and fight in defense of the faith and bring about not only the salvation of the world
in the here and now but eternal salvation. For example, Sheikh Azzam, Osama Bin
Laden’s mentor, describes a battle waging between the dar al Islam (the Muslim
world) and the rest of the world, the dar al harb, literally the abode of war, and
the need for all Muslims to rise up and defend the faith. In ‘‘Martyrs: the Building
Block of Nations,’’ Azzam states:
A small group: they are the ones who carry convictions and ambitions.
And an even smaller group from this small group, are the ones who flee
from the worldly life in order to spread and act upon these ambitions.
And an even smaller group from this elite group, are the ones who
sacrifice their souls and their blood in order to bring victory to these
ambitions and principles. . . . It is not possible to reach glory except by
traversing this Path. And glory cannot be architectured except by travers-
ing this Path: the Path of the Blessed Jihad.69
As will be described, current Islamic activism runs the gamut of social movements,
to fundamentalists, to apocalyptic warriors. It is essential to differentiate one type
from another because they each carry distinct countermeasures.



































Comparing the Three Theories, Dynamical Change, and Key Questions
Social movements, fundamentalists, and apocalyptic warriors present a range of
conditions under which religious groups engage in social and political activism
and use violence to further social, political, and religious goals. A brief comparison
of the three lenses illustrates the different characteristics of each form of activism.
First, social movements tend to be large in size and are highly visible. They
typically are comprised of multiple groups and networks that are united around a spe-
cific and limited goal, such as changing a policy, a particular social practice, or (at its
most extreme) revolution. Once achieved, the movement usually breaks up and
groups continue to act on their own agendas. Social movements draw on various
resources to mobilize and organize participants, including material resources, net-
works, narratives, symbols, and other forms of communication. Participants in social
movements may be highly motivated but, due to their size, individuals may come and
go with relative ease. Historically, social movements have had a charismatic leader
who helps to unify different groups, provide inspiration, and direct participants
towards a specific goal. However, recent examples of social movements, particularly
in the Arab Spring uprisings, suggest that social movements may not need charismatic
leaders to form or prosper. Religion provides useful resources to social movements,
such as leadership, networks, moral legitimacy, material resources, and unifying sym-
bols. Violence, if used at all, is an instrument that furthers the movement’s goals.
Fundamentalists emerge in response to two perceived or actual threats to the
faith: secularism, which threatens to erode religion from public life; and new inter-
pretations within the faith, which threaten more traditional understandings of the
religion. Fundamentalists aim to create clear distinctions between the faithful and
the rest by reinforcing specific beliefs and practices (orthodoxism and orthopraxism),
which they claim to be the original, pure, and true practice of the faith. Despite
describing their actions in terms of authenticity, fundamentalists are usually selective
with their use of scripture, symbols, practices, and history. Fundamentalists do not
accept multiple interpretations of the faith, nor is debate welcome; there is only one
correct understanding, which they possess. Fundamentalists choose different means
for reinforcing and defending their interpretation of the faith, including isolation,
political activism, and violence. When violence is used, it is a means for realizing
the group’s goals.
Apocalyptic warriors believe that current calamities are signs that the end of
times is near, and that it is incumbent on all the faithful to rise up and fight on
behalf of God. In extreme cases, apocalyptic warriors aim to foster ‘‘apocalyptic
messianism’’—to create the conditions for the end of times, such as wars, mass fam-
ine, and destruction—which will be followed by a new era of peace and prosperity.
Apocalyptic warriors are usually few in number and highly committed; their pres-
ence initially may not be visible to wider society. Apocalyptic warriors mobilize
around a charismatic leader who helps to make sense of the chaos and directs the
faithful in the right course of action. Apocalyptic warriors believe that violence is
not only necessary to bring about cataclysmic change, but that it is a sacred duty
and will help to cleanse the world of sin and pave the way for the millennium.
Self-sacrifice and martyrdom, giving one’s life for the cause, are necessary actions
that will help realize the promise of salvation.
The conditions that lead to social movements, fundamentalism, and apocalyptic
war are summarized in Table 1.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In theory, these three causal arguments for religious activism are distinct but, in
practice, they are less clear and groups may contain elements of more than one type.
For example, social movements may use apocalyptic imagery and thinking to
mobilize segments of the population. The promise of the return of the 12th Imam—
a messianic leader that Shias believe will restore justice in the world—helped to
mobilize the population against the Shah. This tactic helped create one of the largest
mass protests of the 20th century.
Groups may also change over time and according to shifts in political
circumstances, frustrations within a group, or unfulfilled prophecies. The Muslim
Brotherhood, for example, has the distinctly fundamentalist goals of realizing what
they believe to be the correct interpretation of the faith and to reject new innovations
in Muslim thinking. However, the Muslim Brotherhood, especially in Egypt, has also
sought to create a social movement with the aim of bringing all Muslims ‘‘back’’ to
the faith. The Muslim Brotherhood has also widened its scope by running for office,
which requires mobilizing mass support in the form of votes and, if elected, requires
compromise and working with secular and other religious groups.
A group may also become frustrated with their progress, which could cause it to
shift from one type of activism to another. For example, fundamentalists who are
unable to persuade those within their faith of their beliefs and practices, and who
may actually be losing supporters, could turn to apocalyptic war thinking to explain
their trials as a sign of the apocalypse, to stay the course, and to engage in violence.
Fundamentalists who isolate themselves may move towards paranoia, which could
also fuel apocalyptic war thinking and justify violence and martyrdom.
Several key questions can help identify the different causal paths of social move-
ments, fundamentalism, and apocalyptic war. First, what does victory look like to
the group or movement? In other words, what are the goals for which the group
is fighting? Social movements typically have specific and limited goals, such as chan-
ging a policy, and victory is measured by the degree to which these goals are met.
Fundamentalists may also have specific goals, such as to preserve what they believe
to be the correct interpretation of the faith, but these goals are significantly broader
than changing a policy or even a head of state. Victory for a fundamentalist, there-
fore, is less clear than for social movements. Apocalyptic warriors’ goals transcend
this world to include fostering the conditions of the apocalypse and the hope of
salvation.
Within the question of the group’s goals, it is also important to consider both
what the group says and what it does, which offers interesting clues about a group
and its organization. Specifically, do rhetoric and actions mirror each other, or
not? For example, around the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Al Qaeda’s senior
leadership expressed frustration over the affiliate Al Qaeda in Iraq’s brutal tactics
and high casualty rates among Iraqi civilians, which was driving the population away
from the movement. The senior leadership, in other words, wanted to win large seg-
ments of the population over to their movement, but the actions of their affiliate were
losing support among the people.70 This disconnect between the rhetoric and goals of
senior leaders, and the goals and actions of their subordinates, suggests that organiza-
tional control was not tight with Al Qaeda at this time, and that there were disagree-
ments between what Stout calls the ‘‘strategists’’ and the ‘‘foot soldiers.’’71 This
disconnect offers opportunities for countermeasures, which will be discussed below.
Second, who are the leaders and followers? Leadership will most likely look dif-
ferent depending on the type of group. Social movements require leaders that various



































segments of society see as legitimate to successfully foster mass mobilization. If reli-
gion is involved, social movements will most likely draw from well-known religious
leaders from within the clergy. Examples of these leaders include Rev. Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. in the U.S. Civil Rights movement, Anglican Bishop Desmond
Tutu in the anti-apartheid movement, and the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s leader-
ship in the Iranian revolution. Fundamentalist leaders may come from within the
established religious leadership, or may be from outside the leadership and in direct
opposition to it. The U.S. anti-abortion initiative drew from ordained ministers of a
variety of Christian denominations. However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership
is not typically from the trained Islamic leadership (the Ulama) in Egypt, and stands
in direct criticism of what they see as the Ulama’s failed leadership. Apocalyptic war-
riors also tend to have leaders that are not part of the trained clergy and therefore
cannot easily be censured by religious hierarchy. Prior to the start of the First
Crusade in 1096, Peter the Hermit—a self-proclaimed religious leader—whipped
up popular sentiment for the Crusade, promising the second coming of Jesus and
salvation for its participants. His legitimacy stemmed from his charisma and believed
connection to the divine, not his ties to the Roman Catholic hierarchy.
Social movements will likely have a wide array of participants from a variety of
groups all unified around a common purpose, such as changing a policy or ousting a
country’s leader. Adherents within a fundamentalist movement will look much more
uniform and will likely conform to a clear-cut and rigid set of beliefs and practices.
Apocalyptic warriors tend to be relatively few in number and highly committed.
Apocalyptic warriors may keep their group hidden from mainstream society as they
fight to bring about the conditions of the apocalypse.
Also within this question, it is important to ask if leaders and followers want the
same thing. Primary documents from Al Qaeda following the 9=11 attacks suggest
that the senior leadership wanted to create a social movement aimed at bringing the
entire Muslim world to what they believed to be the correct interpretation of the faith.
However, some rank and file were joining the movement with the desire to hasten the
apocalypse and earn salvation for themselves and their family. This disconnect
between leaders and followers created problems for organizational unity and purpose.
Third, it is important to ask: What does the group’s organization look like? Each
of these types of religious activism has different organizational structures. Social
movements tend to be open and porous; participants can come or go from the move-
ment and it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell how many are part of the movement
once it takes root and grows within the population. Furthermore, social movements
can be relatively flat structures, as was the case in the Arab Spring, or could be com-
posed of a multitude of smaller hierarchical organizations that are only loosely
affiliated with one another. Fundamentalist groups tend to be closed movements
with clear distinctions of who is in and who is out, along with authoritative leader-
ship and hierarchy. This type of organizational structure creates the necessary con-
trol over beliefs and behavior. Apocalyptic warriors also tend to have closed
organizations with hierarchy to impose control over its followers. But apocalyptic
thinking can spin out of control and leaders can lose control over their followers,
as was the case with Peter the Hermit and the People’s Crusade and some of Al
Qaeda’s apocalyptic thinking and martyrdom operations that have killed more
Muslims than foreigners.
These three principal questions for identifying religious activism—the goals, the
leaders and followers, and the organizational structure of the group—are important



































for formulating countermeasures for containing violent religious activism. As the
composition, tactics, and goals of social movements, fundamentalists, and apocalyp-
tic warriors vary, so do countermeasures against these groups.
Countermeasures in Religiously Motivated Violence
Not all religious activism requires measures aimed at countering its effects; some
religious activism has goals that are productive to society and governance. The
U.S. Civil Rights movement, the anti-apartheid movement, Bishop Desmond Tutu’s
anti-apartheid mobilization, the Dalai Lama’s non-violent bid for Tibetan indepen-
dence, and Gandhi’s Quit India movement are all examples of religious activism that
have spurred societies to become more just and equitable. Therefore, the first con-
sideration when confronted with religious activism should be the goals for which
the movement is fighting and the extent to which these goals promote greater liberty
to all within a society, country, or region.72 If they do, then measures aimed at
countering the movement are most likely unnecessary.
However, not all religious activism serves the greater good and much of it does
require a reaction from the state. Therefore, countermeasures for each of the three
variants are proposed below.
Social movements, including religious social movements, tend to have specific
and limited goals; therefore countermeasures should focus on negotiation and
compromise between the state and the movement. Negotiations and compromise
could allow for the state and the movement to come to common ground and under-
standing, specifically on goals relating to changing a policy or practice. For social
movements that aim to oust a leader or change a government, compromise on either
side is unlikely, given the objective. However, negotiations could help facilitate a
peaceful change of leadership, depending on the nature of the state.
If popular, embedded in society, and viewed as legitimate, the state’s use of
violence to counter a social movement may be counterproductive, especially if the
movement is focused on upending the regime. The state’s use of violence to counter
a social movement, therefore, has a limited but potentially useful role. The state
could use the threat of violence or its actual employment to bring the movement
to the negotiation table or keep it from leaving. It could also use force to contain
fringe movements bent on using terrorist tactics or other forms of violence to further
the cause. Overall, however, the state’s use of force to counter social movements
should be minimal.
Fundamentalists are highly reactionary, particularly to perceived or actual
threats to their understanding of the faith. Overall, the goal in confronting funda-
mentalism should be to prevent the group from further radicalizing, and to bring
it back into a more mainstream understanding of the religion. Therefore, counter-
measures should focus on reducing the sense of threat these groups feel. One
approach states could employ to reducing fundamentalists’ sense of threat is to give
the group space to retreat and practice their interpretation of the faith. For example,
the 2002 school voucher program in the No Child Left Behind Act made it easier for
parents to opt out of public education and use their tax dollars to pay for enrollment
in private schools or home schooling. Although controversial, this piece of legis-
lation gave creationists space to adhere to their beliefs and practices.73 However,
if the state were to employ this approach, it would be necessary to monitor the group
for signs of further radicalization, which could occur if isolated.74



































Perhaps even more so than with social movements, the use of force as a counter-
measure against fundamentalists has severe limitations; using force against a group
that has a heightened sense of threat would most likely exacerbate these anxieties.
Force could be useful to contain or eliminate groups that have become severely
isolated and pose a threat to wider society, but this approach would most likely be use-
ful under the direst of circumstances. Space, monitoring, and the use of law enforce-
ment to contain fundamentalists and reduce their sense of threat is a better approach.
Finally, apocalyptic warriors require special countermeasures and perhaps are
the most difficult group for states to neutralize. Unlike social movements and funda-
mentalists, all apocalyptic warriors who direct their violence outside the group are
a threat to wider society. Furthermore, apocalyptic warriors anticipate confron-
tation and trials; it is written into their expectations of the apocalypse. Therefore
directly confronting apocalyptic warriors, especially with force, could feed their
ideology and potentially grow the movement. Juergensmeyer argues that Cosmic
War has two solutions: the first is the total defeat of the group, the second is ‘‘redir-
ecting the mythology,’’ or challenging the group’s interpretation of the faith.75 With
Juergensmeyer’s second solution, Cosmic War’s zeal could be reduced by sparking
a debate within a religious tradition over the immanency of the apocalypse. A debate
over this interpretation throws into question the inerrancy of the leader and his or
her views, which opens the door for an adjustment of the ideology. For example,
the Saudi government has helped facilitate an internet chat room that draws jihadis
into a debate with rehabilitated terrorists about the religious necessity and justifi-
cation of their actions.76 The idea is to get potential recruits and those within the
organization to question the ideology. Within this approach, it is important that
the state does not engage the group directly in a theological debate, because the state
is most likely seen as illegitimate and incapable of having a theological discussion.
Similarly, using the religion’s mainstream clergy may be counterproductive because
apocalyptic warriors often stand in critique of clergy for failing to see the signs of the
apocalypse. Rather, much can be gained from engaging former apocalyptic warriors
that have had a change of heart, as has been done in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
London.77 In this case, the messenger is as important as the message.
The use of force as a potential countermeasure to apocalyptic warriors has a lim-
ited, but useful role. Force could be used to go after a group that is small, isolated,
and contained. In this case, the state’s use of force would most likely fulfill apoca-
lyptic warriors’ ideology, but wider society would not be in agreement with this
worldview, and therefore would not join the fight. Similarly, force could be used
to take out an apocalyptic warrior’s leader if the group’s organization is well
understood and the state has an understanding of how that would affect the group.
As previously argued, apocalyptic thinking transforms into apocalyptic violence by
a charismatic leader, and removing that leader could end the threat.
Finally, it is worth noting that, in the case of Islamically motivated apocalyptic
war, the early days of the Arab Spring stood as a sharp critique to its worldview.
Rather than fight on a spiritual plane and focus on salvation in the hereafter, masses
took to the streets in several countries demanding the right to choose government
leaders, ensure greater liberties, such as freedom of speech and assembly, and to
establish civil society independent from governmental interference. The first protests
of the Arab Spring, in other words, demanded earthly change and rights rather than
apocalyptic visions of final judgment. Initially, these developments appeared to be
good news for the ideological battle against apocalyptic war thinking.



































However, religiously motivated groups also mobilized to run in elections and
promote their specific interpretations of the faith and for their greater inclusion in
government and public life. These groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and
Al-Nour parties in Egypt and the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, conform to fundamen-
talist thinking and pose challenges for intra-Muslim, inter-religious, and religious-
secular dynamics in these countries. As these countries continue to struggle with
transitioning from years of authoritarian rule to democracy, the fundamentalist
agendas of these groups will pose considerable challenges to shared power and
democratic norms.
Moreover, despite the early optimism of participants and spectators of the Arab
Spring, apocalyptic warriors have not gone away in the region; their ideology persists
as one of many critiques against earthly goals and failed social and political experi-
ments. The festering conflict in Syria has become a bellwether for a new generation
of apocalyptic warriors, including groups aligned with Al Qaeda, that see jihad
as necessary and desirable for earthly and spiritual change and who have made
the conflict their training grounds for recruits from throughout the Muslim world.
Similar groups with apocalyptic mindsets exist in Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia,
Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and beyond. Therefore,
the battle against apocalyptic warriors and violent fundamentalists has not dimin-
ished, despite the early optimism of the Arab Spring. These mindsets are not new
and are unlikely to ever be eradicated.
Acknowledgment
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Notes
1. Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the
Secular State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). This argument is also described
in: Mark Juergensmeyer, Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, From
Christian Militias to Al Qaeda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
2. Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shaw, God’s Century:
Resurgent Religion and Global Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), 2–9.
3. See, for example: David C. Rapoport, ‘‘Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in
Three Religious Traditions,’’ American Political Science Review 78, no. 3 (September 1984):
658–677; David C. Rapoport, ‘‘Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror?’’ in Paul
Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart, eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen:
Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 73–88; Bernard Lewis, The Assassins (New York: Basic
Books, 1968); Thomas Madden, A Concise History of the Crusades (New York: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1999); Tessa Bartholomeusz, ‘‘In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in
Buddhist Sri Lanka,’’ Journal of Buddhist Ethics 6 (1999): 1–16.
4. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 28.
5. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (see note 4 above), 258.
6. Toft, Philpott, and Shaw, God’s Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics







































10. David C. Rapoport, ‘‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,’’ in Audrey Cronin
and J. Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46–73.
11. Ibid., 61–63.
12. Jonathan Fox, ‘‘Is Islam More Conflict Prone Than Other Religions? A Cross-
Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict,’’ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 6, no. 2 (Summer
2000): 1–24, 1.
13. Jonathan Fox, ‘‘Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West,’’ Journal
of Peace Research 38, no. 4 (2001): 459–472, 459.
14. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, ‘‘Separation of Religion and State in the 21st Cen-
tury: Comparing the Middle East and Western Democracies,’’ Comparative Politics 37, no. 3
(April 2005): 317–335; Jonathan Fox, ‘‘The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance For-
mation by Ethno-Religious Minorities,’’ Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 3 (1999): 289–307.
15. Jonathan Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century (Lanham;
Lexington Books, 2004), 103.
16. Matthias Basedau, Georg Struever, Johannes Vuellers, and Time Wegenast, ‘‘Do
Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa,’’
Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 5 (2011): 752–779.
17. Matthias Basedau and Alexander De Juan, ‘‘The ‘Ambivalence of the Sacred’ in
Africa: The Impact of Religion on Peace and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa,’’ GIGAWorking
Papers, 23, no. 70 (March 2008): 1–35.
18. Kenneth D. Wald, Dennis E Owen, and Samuel S. Hill, Jr., ‘‘Churches and Political
Communities,’’ American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (June 1988): 531–548.
19. Kenneth Wald, Adam L. Silverman, and Kevin S. Fridy, ‘‘Making Sense of Religion
in Political Life,’’ Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005): 121–143.
20. Robyn Driskell, Elizabeth Embry, and Larry Lyon, ‘‘Faith and Politics: The
Influence of Religious Beliefs on Political Participation,’’ Social Science Quarterly 89, no. 2
(2008): 294–314, 294.
21. Guillermo Trejo, ‘‘Religious Competition and Ethnic Mobilization in Latin America:
Why the Catholic Church Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico,’’ American Political
Science Review 103, no. 3 (August 2009): 323–341.
22. Quintan Wictorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2004), 2.
23. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspec-
tives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural
Framings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
24. McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (see note 23 above),
2–3. See also: Sidney Tarrow, ‘‘States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social
Movements,’’ in McAdam et al., eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (see note
23 above), 41–61.
25. McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (see note 23
above), 3.
26. Ibid., 3–4. See also: John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, ‘‘Resource Mobilization
and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,’’ The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6
(May 1977): 1212–1241.
27. As quoted in McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (see note
23 above), 6. See also: Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘‘Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment,’’ Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 611–639.
28. McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (see note 23 above), 5.
29. Ibid., 5–6.
30. As suggested by Tina Rosenberg, Join the Club: How Peer Pressure Can Transform
the World (New York: Norton, 2011).
31. Rhys H. Williams, ‘‘Constructing the Public Good: Social Movements and Cultural
Resources,’’ Social Problems 2, no. 1 (1995): 124–144.
32. Jeffrey R. Halverson, Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of
Islam (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2012).
33. Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for
Liberation, 4th U.S. ed. (Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2010), 1–7. Sharp argues that



































mass movements should be non-violent to successfully effect change because violence prevents
the necessary development of social and political institutions that will aid in the successful
transition of the state from dictator to democracy.
34. Christian Smith, ‘‘Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In,’’ in
Christian Smith, ed., Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism
(New York: Routledge, 1996), 1–28. See also: John A. Hannigan, ‘‘Social Movement Theory
and the Sociology of Religion: Toward a New Synthesis,’’ Sociological Analysis 52, no. 4
(Winter 1991): 311–331.
35. Smith, ‘‘Correcting a Curious Neglect’’ (see note 34 above), 9–13, 17.
36. Dwight B. Billings, ‘‘Religion as Opposition: A Gramscian Analysis,’’ The American
Journal of Sociology 96, no. 1 (1990): 1–31.
37. Rhys H. Williams, ‘‘The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action: Constraints,
Opportunities, and the Symbolic Life of Social Movements,’’ in David A. Snow, Sarah
A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2004), 17, 91–115.
38. Quintan Wictorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2004). See also: Asaf Bayat, ‘‘Islamism and Social
Movement Theory,’’ Third World Quarterly 26, no. 6 (2005): 891–908.
39. Aldon Morris, ‘‘The Black Church in the Civil Rights Movement: The SCLC as the
Decentralized, Radical Arm of the Black Church,’’ in Christian Smith, ed., Disruptive
Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism (New York: Routledge, 1996), 29–48.
40. M. M. Salehi, ‘‘Radical Islamic Insurgency in the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979,’’
in Smith, ed., Disruptive Religion (see note 39 above), 47–66.
41. See, for example: Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, eds., Arab Spring in Egypt:
Revolution and Beyond (Washington, DC: American University in Cairo Press, 2012).
42. See, for example, Maryjane Osa, ‘‘Pastoral Mobilization and Contention: The
Religious Foundations of the Solidarity Movement in Poland,’’ in Smith, ed., Disruptive
Religion (see note 39 above), 67–86.
43. Juergensmeyer, New Cold War? (see note 1 above), 4–5.
44. John Esposito, Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press,
1995), 7–8; Juergensmeyer, New Cold War? (see note 1 above), 4–6.
45. Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict in the Late Twentieth Century (see note 15 above), 113.
46. Juergensmeyer, New Cold War? (see note 1 above), 30–35. See also: Juergensmeyer,
Global Rebellion (note 1 above), 9–38.
47. Amy J. Binder, Contentious Curricula: Afrocentrism and Creationism in American
Public Schools (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
48. ‘‘Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod,’’ Edward L. Queen II, Stephen R. Prothero,
Gardiner H. Shattuck, Jr., eds., Encyclopedia of American Religious History, Vol. 1, 3rd ed.
(New York: Facts on File, 2009), 592–594.
49. David C. Rapoport, ‘‘Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups,’’
in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking
Polities, Economies, and Militance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 429.
50. David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute
of Peace, 1994).
51. Jennifer Jefferis, Armed For Life: The Army of God and Anti-Abortion Terror in
the United States (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011); Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind
of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2000), 19–29; Christopher Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in the America: From the
Klan to Al Qaeda (New York: Routledge, 2003), 38–40.
52. Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: The Rise
of Fundamentalisms Around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 93–98.
53. For more on the Haredim, see Ian Lustick, For the Land and the Lord: Jewish
Fundamentalism in Israel (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1988).
54. Quintan Wictorowicz, ‘‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,’’ Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 29 (2006): 207–239, quote taken from p. 207.
55. Ibid.
56. Mark Juergensmeyer, ‘‘Sacrifice and Cosmic War,’’ in Mark Juergensmeyer, ed.,
Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World (New York: Routledge, 1992), 106–111. This



































theory is further described in Ch. 2 of Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? (see note 1
above), in Terror in the Mind of God (see note 51 above), and in Global Rebellion (see note 1
above). However, the best articulation of this form of religious violence, including its causal
logic, comes from ‘‘Sacrifice and Cosmic War’’ (see note 56 above).
57. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (see note 51 above), 156.
58. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (see note 51 above), 148.
59. Robert S. Robins and Jerrold M. Post, Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of
Hatred (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 113–114.
60. Robins and Post, Political Paranoia (see note 59 above), 114–115.
61. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (see note 51 above), 149–153.
62. Elliot R. Wolfson, ‘‘Unveiling the Veil: Apocalyptic, Secrecy, and the Jewish Mystical
Imaginaire,’’ American Jewish Studies Perspective: The Apocalypse Issue (2012): 18–23.
63. George R. Knight, Millennial Fever and the End of the World: A Study of Millerite
Adventism (Boise: Pacific Press, 1993).
64. David C. Rapoport, ‘‘Terrorism and the Weapons of the Apocalypse,’’ National
Security Studies Quarterly 5 (1999): 49–63.
65. Robert the Monk, ‘‘Urban II: Speech at Claremont 1095 (Robert the Monk
Version),’’ in James Harvey Robinson, ed., Readings in European History: Vol. I (Boston:
Ginn and Co., 1904), 312–316, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/urban2a.html
66. Karen Armstrong, Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths (New York: Ballantine Books,
1996), 272; Thomas F. Madden, A Concise History of the Crusades (Lanham: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1999), 18–20.
67. Gary Dickson, ‘‘Stephen of Cloyes, Philip Augustus, and the Children’s Crusade of
1212,’’ in Barbara N. Sargent-Bauer, ed., Journey Towards God: Pilgrimage and Crusade
(Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University Press, 1992), 83–105.
68. Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic
Violence and the New Global Terrorism (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1999); Angus
M. Muir, ‘‘Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo,’’
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22, no. 1 (1991), 79–91; David E. Kaplan and Andrew
Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London:
Hutchinson, 1996); D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York:
Weatherhill, 1996); Gavin Cameron, ‘‘Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum
Shinrikyo and Al Qaida,’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22, no. 4 (1999): 277–309; William
Rosenau, ‘‘Aum Shinrikyo’s Biological Weapons Program: Why Did it Fail?’’ Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism’’ 24, no. 4 (2001): 289–301; Ian Reader, ‘‘Spectres and Shadows:
Aum Shinrikyo and the Road to Megiddo,’’ Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 1
(2002): 145–186.
69. Abdullah Azzam, ‘‘Martyrs: The Building Block of Nations,’’ Religioscope,
http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_martyrs.htm
70. Mark E. Stout et al., The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational
Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2008), 48.
71. Ibid.
72. This argument is developed by Toft, Philpott, and Shaw, God’s Century:
Resurgent Religion and Global Politics (see note 2 above), 174–206.
73. Scott Keeter, ‘‘On Darwin’s 200th Birthday, Americans Still Divided About
Evolution,’’ Pew Research Center for People and the Press, February 5, 2009, http://
pewresearch.org/pubs/1107/polling-evolution-creationism
74. This idea is explored in: Sean Everton, ‘‘A Social Network Theory of Religious
Extremism and Violence,’’ (paper presented at the Association for the Study of Religion,
Economics and Culture Conference, Washington, DC, April, 2013).
75. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (see note 51 above), 163.
76. Y. Yehoshua, ‘‘Reeducation of Extremists in Saudi Arabia,’’ Middle East
Research Institute, no. 260, January 18, 2006, 1–6.
77. See, for example: Lawrence Right, ‘‘The Rebellion Within: An Al Qaeda Mastermind
Questions Terrorism,’’ New Yorker, June 2, 2008, 1–17; Richard Bonin, ‘‘Jihadists and
‘The Narrative,’ ’’ 60 Minutes, April 25, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=
6430933n
360 H. S. Gregg
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
av
al 
Po
stg
rad
ute
 Sc
ho
ol,
 D
ud
ley
 K
no
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
3:2
9 1
5 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
